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Abstract Existing datasets provided by statistical agencies (e.g. Eurostat) show 
that the economic and financial crisis that unfolded in 2008 significantly impacted 
the lives and livelihoods of young people across Europe. Taking these official sta-
tistics as a starting point, the collaborative research project “Cultural Pathways to 
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Economic Self-Sufficiency and Entrepreneurship in Europe” (CUPESSE) gener-
ated new survey data on the economic and social situation of young Europeans (18–
35  years). The CUPESSE dataset allows for country-comparative assessments of 
young people’s perceptions about their socio-economic situation. Furthermore, the 
dataset includes a variety of indicators examining the socio-economic situation of 
both young adults and their parents. In this data article, we introduce the CUPESSE 
dataset to political and social scientists in an attempt to spark a debate on the meas-
urements, patterns and mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of economic 
self-sufficiency as well as its political implications.
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Introduction
The concept of economic self-sufficiency features prominently in many international 
organisations’ publications (e.g. Hetling et  al. 2016). The Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, provides an aggregate-
level definition of self-sufficiency, which concentrates on the “extent of participation 
in the economy and society and how well individuals are able to get through daily 
life on their own” (OECD 2007: 21). In terms of measurement, the OECD refers 
to the overall employment rate, the share of the population in jobless households, 
the average number of years of schooling and the average school performance of 
children at age 15. In addition to this general concept of economic self-sufficiency, 
there exist more specific definitions reflecting the characteristics of particular target 
groups (Gowdy and Pearlmutter 1993). Despite the prominence it gained, the con-
cept of economic self-sufficiency has also been criticised for being difficult to define 
and even more difficult to evaluate (Leibson 2005).
Although conceptualising and measuring economic self-sufficiency is challeng-
ing, it warrants closer attention due to its immediate implications for an important 
topic in political science: attitudes towards welfare state and redistribution (Alesina 
and Giuliano 2011; Svallfors 2012). Citizens’ preferences for redistributive policies 
can be traced back to both economic self-interest and personal beliefs (Alesina and 
Giuliano 2011; Dion and Birchfield 2010; Jost 2006). Furthermore, individuals draw 
inferences about the degree of inequality and poverty in society from their immedi-
ate social context, such as family and friends. These inferences, in turn, can shape 
attitudes towards welfare provision and redistribution (Dawtry et al. 2015). Learning 
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more about young people’s perceptions of their own economic self-sufficiency is 
therefore crucial for understanding the social and attitudinal bases of their prefer-
ences in such a central policy domain.
The collaborative research project “Cultural Pathways to Economic Self-Suffi-
ciency and Entrepreneurship in Europe” (CUPESSE) funded by the European Com-
mission from February 2014 to January 2018 focused on young adults, their eco-
nomic situation and their values and attitudes regarding work and education (Tosun 
et  al. 2018).1 While an extremely heterogeneous group with a variety of different 
needs, young people face considerable challenges and risks in terms of transition-
ing from school to work, entering the labour market and, ultimately, attaining some 
form of economic self-sufficiency. Many of the risks and hurdles young people must 
navigate along their journey to adulthood were simply not present, or at least not to 
the same degree, when their parents and grandparents were their age (O’Reilly et al. 
2015).
Traditionally, in the European Union (EU), youth unemployment has mostly been 
a more acute issue in the Southern European countries, but the 2008 financial cri-
sis and the subsequent sovereign debt crises have exacerbated the situation across 
Europe (see Lahusen et al. 2013; O’Reilly et al. 2015; Tosun et al. 2014, 2016, 2017; 
Tosun 2017). Spells of unemployment early in life are likely to leave scars, which 
can also affect later employment prospects (Dvouletý et al. 2018). Unemployment 
may also have an impact on political socialisation and patterns of political behaviour 
(Albacete 2014; Emmenegger et al. 2017; Neundorf et al. 2013).
Many young Europeans hold precarious jobs and must therefore rely on the eco-
nomic support of their parents. Baranowska-Rataj et al. (2016) highlight this in the 
UK, where employment became increasingly precarious between the 1990s and the 
start of the 2000s, particularly for (young) men with low educational qualifications. 
This type of employment (e.g. through zero-hour contracts or fixed-term contracts) 
reduces young people’s economic autonomy and increases their financial vulnerabil-
ity. Moreover, precarious working conditions can also affect political attitudes with 
regard to welfare and redistributive preferences.
In this article, we present the CUPESSE dataset and discuss its relevance for 
political economy and political sociology. We first introduce the measurement 
approach developed by the consortium to assess young people’s perceptions of their 
economic self-sufficiency. Second, we contrast young people’s economic situations 
with their parents in order to gain initial insights into whether intergenerational dif-
ferences exist. Third, we compare young people’s attitudes with their parents’ atti-
tudes about two interrelated social policy domains: welfare benefits and universal 
basic income. Lastly, we look at the correlates of young respondents’ attitudes using 
multiple regression analysis and offer some concluding remarks.
1 The CUPESSE dataset including the full documentation of the data can be obtained from the GESIS 
data archive: https ://searc h.gesis .org/resea rch_data/ZA747 5. The dataset for replicating the analysis pre-
sented in this paper can be accessed from the European Political Science homepage.
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Conceptual considerations for surveying two generations
Two strands of research motivate our interest in comparing the attitudes of 
young people with those of their parents. First, the literature in political science 
has provided extensive insights into generational differences with regard to atti-
tudes towards political institutions and policies as well as political participation 
(e.g. Melo and Stockemer 2014; Abendschön and Tausendpfund 2017). A recent 
example is the voting behaviour in the Brexit referendum in the UK: young peo-
ple mostly supported the country’s membership in the EU, whereas older citizens 
predominantly voted in favour of leaving (Hobolt 2016).
Second, and drawing on advances in social psychology, intergenerational cul-
tural transmission refers to the transmission of values, beliefs, knowledge, prac-
tices from one generation to the next. In this process, parents generally have 
the most substantial transmissive role (Abendschön 2013; Schönpflug 2009; 
Trommsdorff 2009; Van Deth et al. 2011). While there are of course other factors 
that can influence socialisation, such as peers and other social groups (Quintelier 
2013), in line with the extant literature, we emphasise the crucial role of the fam-
ily for early socialisation, fundamental value orientations and first experiences 
that shape both lifestyles and life courses (e.g. Albacete 2014; Neundorf et  al. 
2013; Abendschön and Tausendpfund 2017).
Intergenerational transmission can also involve different forms of capital as defined 
by Bourdieu (1997). Economic capital is immediately and directly convertible into 
monetary resources and is particularly suited to institutionalisation in the  form of 
property rights. Some simple examples for economic capital are money, wealth and 
all sorts of income. Access to economic capital increases the probability that young 
people receive financial support for their education (Campanella et al. 2013).
Social capital represents the total of actual and potential resources that are 
associated with the possession of a permanent network of more or less institu-
tionalised relationships based on mutual acquaintance or recognition (Bourdieu 
1997; see also Maloney and Roßteutscher 2009; Roßteutscher 2010). Examples of 
social capital are social relations such as friendships, trust relationships, business 
relationships or memberships in groups, organisations or professional associa-
tions (see Maloney and van Deth 2010; Christoforou 2011; Freitag and Kirchner 
2011; Cemalcilar and Gökşen 2014). Social networks play a crucial role in the 
path to economic self-sufficiency (Lorenzini and Giugni 2012), as they influence 
the individual’s perception of opportunities and thereby conditions, for example, 
an individual’s decision to pursue self-employment (Davidsson and Honig 2003; 
Jagannathan et al. 2017; Rapp et al. 2018). The family’s social capital is likely to 
influence a child’s social capital, for s/he can also rely on the parents or relatives, 
friends and acquaintances when developing their own network of social relations.
The dominant interpretation of cultural capital focuses on competences within 
the elite culture and has become distinct from aspects such as educational skills 
and achievements. When conceived in this way, empirical research has shown 
that cultural capital is transmitted from parents to their children (e.g. Kraaykamp 
and Nieuwbeerta 2000; Kraaykamp and Van Eijck 2010).
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We go one step further and argue that the parent’s socio-economic status defines 
the reference point for young people’s career expectations. Career and education-
related aspirations of parents are likely to influence the career choices their children 
make.2 Furthermore, parents can serve as role models and increase the perceived 
feasibility of certain career decisions. For example, having parents who are self-
employed can make this career path appear more feasible (Jagannathan et al. 2017; 
Mühlböck et al. 2017; Vegetti and Adăscăliţei 2017).
There are  good reasons to study young people’s attitudes and compare them 
to their parents (see also studies on genetic transmission such as Alford et al. 2005; 
Fazekas and Littvay 2015). Families are arguably the most important socialising 
force when it comes to young people’s economic and career outcomes. Such out-
comes are not only closely linked to economic self-sufficiency, but also affect politi-
cal attitudes and political participation (Albacete 2014; Neundorf et al. 2013).
Details on the CUPESSE dataset
The main goal of the CUPESSE project was to collect data on different indicators 
related to the concept of economic self-sufficiency and to explore the role families 
play in the journey from education to employment. CUPESSE involved social sci-
entists at academic institutions in 11 countries: Austria, the Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK. 
The country selection reflects important dimensions of economic variation within 
Europe (e.g. Tosun et  al. 2016) as well as variation with regard to their political 
systems and welfare state arrangements (e.g. Jensen 2008; Bonoli and Natali 2012; 
Chevalier 2016; Jensen et al. 2018; Tosun et al. 2017). CUPESSE involved research-
ers from all across the social sciences: sociology, political science, psychology, eco-
nomics, education and business administration.
The core activity of the CUPESSE project was the development of a survey 
instrument designed to study young adults’ attitudes regarding work and education 
as well as their current socio-economic situation. Although many statistical agencies 
use age 25 as the end of youth, we took seriously the empirical evidence document-
ing the prolonged transition to adulthood in many societies (e.g. Arnett 2014). Our 
sample therefore included young adults between the ages of 18 (to ensure we were 
only working with legal adults) and 35. Moreover, we were interested in how social, 
cultural and economic capital (e.g. Bourdieu 1997) not only affects young people’s 
current situation, but also whether these forms of capital were transmitted from their 
parents (see, e.g. Kraaykamp and Nieuwbeerta 2000; Kraaykamp and Van Eijck 
2010). The development and implementation of the CUPESSE survey involved both 
2 We are aware that attitudes on education and training are also affected by context variables such as the 
design of the political economy (see, e.g. Busemeyer and Jensen 2012).
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young Europeans and their parents, with separate questionnaires developed for each 
group.3
We asked the young survey respondents whom they considered to be their mother 
or father figure in order to identify the parents and also how to contact them.4 The 
response options went beyond biological parents and included the spouse/partner 
of a given parent, grandparents and other persons (which then had to be specified). 
Depending on how the young respondents answered the initial questions about 
whom they considered to be their parents, they were asked, for example, to pro-
vide information about their mother’s and/or father’s highest level of education and 
employment status. Consequently, we were able to gather a lot of parent-related 
information from the young people themselves. For other questions, we surveyed 
the parents directly. To this end, we first asked the young people whether it would be 
possible to contact their parents,5 whom we should best contact,6 and finally for the 
contact information of one or both parents.
The master version of the two questionnaires was written in English and repre-
sents the collaborative and iterative efforts of the entire project consortium. The 
English questionnaire was youth-proofed (discussed in depth with 12 young peo-
ple as well as with youth workers providing employment support) by the project 
partners in Newcastle.7 In a next step, the master versions were translated into the 
respective national languages by each country team. To ensure that the different lan-
guage versions of the English instrument were conceptually equivalent in each of the 
target countries, the questionnaires were subsequently translated back to English and 
then checked by bilingual language experts. The process of producing national ques-
tionnaires went well beyond simply translating them into their target languages—the 
response categories also had to be adapted for the respective countries. For example, 
the questionnaires for Austria, Germany and Switzerland8 are all in German, but the 
formulation of both the questions and the responses (e.g. for questions about educa-
tion) varies across these three countries.
Nine of the 11 youth questionnaires were conducted online, one was conducted 
face-to-face using Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (Hungary), and one 
was conducted face-to-face using paper and pencil (Turkey). The Hungarian and the 
Turkish teams could not rely on online surveying due to low Internet coverage. For 
3 Questionnaire pre-tests were conducted in each country between December 2015 and February 2016. 
Insights from the pre-tests were discussed during a project meeting in February 2016. The pre-testing 
mainly focused on ways to maximise the number of parental contacts provided by the young adult 
respondents.
4 The corresponding variables in the dataset are YQ28_mother and YQ28_father. In the UK, the polling 
firm randomly selected which parent to contact, which is one of the reasons why there are more fathers in 
the sample.
5 The variable in the dataset is YQCONTACT.
6 Captured by the variables PMCORD and PFCORD.
7 To see whether the questionnaire also adequately captured the demand side of youth labour, the teams 
at Heidelberg University and University of Vienna also carried out interviews with employers (Steiber 
2016; Weiß and Schuck 2016).
8 The questionnaire for Switzerland was translated into German, French and Italian in accordance with 
similar surveys such as the European Social Survey.
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the parental surveys, most of the interviews were conducted using mixed modes, 
including online (Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, UK), Computer 
Assisted Telephone Interviewing (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Spain), Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (Hungary) and paper and 
pencil (Switzerland, Turkey). This heterogeneity in parent survey modes was the 
result of the type of information young people provided us with when asked about 
how to contact their parent(s). For example, while some provided a telephone num-
ber, others gave only an email address. The various polling firms also provided guid-
ance about how to best approach the parental generation (for details on Germany, 
see Shore and Tosun 2018).9
Despite the different survey modes, the sampling frames were consistent. For the 
youth questionnaire, survey companies were asked to provide a probability sample 
of individuals between the ages of 18 and 35 representative of employment sta-
tus (e.g. employed; self-employed; unemployed; in education/training), NUTS 2 
region,10 age group, education and migration background/minority group member-
ship. For the parental questionnaire, the strategy consisted of recruiting all parents 
for which the youth provided contact information.
In terms of sample size, the minimum requirement per country was 1000 young 
adult respondents and 500 parents, with a reasonable proportion of fathers and 
mothers. It was important to agree to these minimum numbers since the practical 
constraints (e.g. the total number of individuals registered with the online panels) 
and the costs varied considerably across the individual countries.
Table  1 provides an overview of the number of completed questionnaires by 
young people (by gender) and their parents (broken down by whether the survey was 
completed by the mother, father or both). The table also shows the survey modes 
used for both groups of respondents in the individual countries. The CUPESSE data-
set consists of 20,008 observations (5945 of which have data for at least one parent). 
What we are unable to show in the table is the vast number of variables included in 
the dataset, namely 429 variables (239 of which are from the youth questionnaire).11 
Economic self‑sufficiency
One of the goals of the CUPESSE project was to capture different aspects of eco-
nomic self-sufficiency by building on a broad definition of the concept as “a situ-
ation in which a person is economically independent in the sense of not relying on 
11 The complete CUPESSE dataset with additional information can be accessed via the GESIS data 
archive (see footnote 1).
9 The polling firms contracted in the individual countries were: Gallup (Austria), Median (Czech Repub-
lic), TNS Gallup (Denmark), YouGov (Germany), MRB Hellas (Greece), TÁRKI (Hungary), SWG 
(Italy), Netquest (Spain), Gfs Bern (Switzerland), Infakto (Turkey) and IPSOS Mori (UK).
10 NUTS stands for Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. It is a three-level geocode standard 
for referencing the administrative divisions of countries for statistical purposes developed by the EU. 
Here we refer to the second level of the referencing system—NUTS 2; these are the basic regions for the 
application of regional policies in the EU.
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financial support from her family or the welfare system” (Warmuth et al. 2015: 5). 
In this view, participation in the labour market is but one of many elements to be 
considered, reasonably the first one of a chain which includes possible sources of 
external support.12 Additionally, to take full advantage of the individual-level focus 
of the project, the data also looked at respondents’ perceptions of their own self-
sufficiency. Such perceptions are the crucial link between the actual economic sit-
uation and individuals’ attitudes. For instance, research in political behaviour has 
repeatedly shown that people’s perceptions of the economy act as a filter between 
the objective economic conditions and electoral choices (e.g. Debus et  al. 2014). 
Hence, by looking at respondents’ assessments of their own economic self-suffi-
ciency, the CUPESSE data offer a valuable resource to study the individual under-
pinnings of attitudes that are generally not captured by other indicators of economic 
performance.
One facet of economic self-sufficiency is income independence, that is, whether 
and to what extent respondents provide for themselves through paid jobs or self-
employment—versus relying on their family or on the state. This indicator is meas-
ured with an item battery, where respondents are asked to select all the sources 
of their income.13 From these observations, we can classify respondents based on 
whether their income fully or partially depends on the family or the state, or whether 
it is completely independent. However, having a fully independent income does not 
always imply being able to afford a decent standard of living, let alone being satis-
fied with one’s own economic situation.
A second aspect of self-sufficiency is the housing situation of the young respond-
ents, that is, whether they live with their parents (or other older family members). 
While this indicator might be heavily affected by people’s own economic conditions 
in contexts (social and cultural) where the constraints to moving out of the parental 
home are primarily economic (see Isengard et al. 2017). The housing situation could 
also be due to other considerations (e.g. potential social stigma associated with liv-
ing alone without being married). Moreover, when looking at young adults living 
with their parents, it is important to distinguish between those who never moved out 
of the parental home and those who moved back after living on their own for a cer-
tain period (the so-called boomerangers).14
Moving from objective indicators towards perceptions, we look at respondents’ 
self-assessed economic conditions. Economically self-sufficient individuals are able 
to provide for themselves and afford a reasonable standard of living. This dimension 
has been captured in the CUPESSE questionnaire by asking respondents to what 
extent during the six months prior to the interview they were able to (1) pay their 
12 See Section A1 in the Supplemental Material for the frequencies of occupational status among the 
young respondents in the CUPESSE survey.
13 Options are paid and self-employment work, redundancy pay, unemployment or other social benefits, 
support from family members or by the partner, investments, savings, inherited money and other non-
social benefits. The relevant variables are YQ10_a-YQ10_i.
14 The item battery YQ28a_0-YQ28a_8 captures whether respondents live alone or with other people, 
including parents, grandparents and other relatives, as well as their partner and/or children. Moreover, 
the question YQ28d captures whether the respondents have ever lived apart from their parents, which 
allowed us to distinguish the boomerangers from those who have  never moved out from the parental 
home.
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bills by themselves, (2) afford decent housing, (3) afford extras like trips or hobbies 
and (4) put some money aside. These four indicators capture two important aspects 
of economic self-sufficiency: the respondents’ ability to afford basic living standards 
(items one and two) and to afford extras (items three and four).15
Finally, a subjective indicator, financial satisfaction, can provide further insights 
into the respondents’ condition. Since this construct is an evaluation, it is of course 
sensitive to a number of unobservable benchmarks, for instance what respondents 
would consider to be a satisfactory situation for themselves, or how generally posi-
tive or negative their outlook on life is. However, when compared to more objec-
tive criteria discussed here, it provides an interesting insight into how young peo-
ple’s expectations are met in their current conditions. In the CUPESSE data, this is 
Fig. 1  Indicators of economic self-sufficiency by country
15 The relevant variables are YQ9_a-YQ9_d. A similar distinction is also made by Gowdy and Pearlmut-
ter (1993).
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measured by asking the respondents to rate the degree of satisfaction with their own 
financial situation on an ordinal four-point Likert scale.16
Figure 1 shows the country frequencies for all indicator types.17 In each panel, 
countries are sorted on the horizontal axis from high to low self-sufficiency with 
respect to the specific factor plotted. The figure illustrates how the indicators cap-
ture different aspects of self-sufficiency that do not necessarily appear alongside one 
another. For instance, looking at the two most objective facets on the top row, we 
see that Hungarian respondents are among the top three in our sample with respect 
to income independence, but they are among the bottom three when it comes to liv-
ing independently from family. A similar albeit less extreme example of this pattern 
is Turkey. The opposite case is Denmark, where less than 50% of the respondents 
have a fully independent income, but about 80% of them live apart from their fam-
ily—which is most likely due to the high proportion of students in the Danish sam-
ple. Looking at the two more subjective indicators on the bottom row, the pattern 
is rather consistent. For both indicators, the top four countries where respondents 
perceive themselves as better off are Denmark, Switzerland, Austria and Germany, 
while the Southern European countries all towards the bottom of the scale. Hungary 
is a somewhat interesting case, where respondents see themselves as very much able 
to afford basics but not extras. This is probably due to the very low costs of living in 
Hungary relative to the other countries in the sample (see Eurostat 2017).
But how do the young respondents fare in terms of economic self-sufficiency 
compared to their parents? The CUPESSE data allow the comparison of two gen-
erations of respondents by asking the same questions of economic self-sufficiency 
to both the young adults and their parents. We focus here on the subjective indica-
tors of self-sufficiency, namely the stated ability to afford basics and extras and the 
satisfaction with one’s own financial situation. While the two objective indicators 
discussed here are important, they use the contribution from the family (in terms 
of income or housing resources) as a baseline to determine the individual self-suf-
ficiency of the young adults. The subjective indicators, on the other hand, can be 
measured in the same way for both parents and children; hence, they allow for a 
more straightforward comparison.
Figure 2 shows the difference between parents and children with respect to their 
self-assessed economic situation—that is, the extent to which the parents and chil-
dren are able to afford basics and extras and their assessment of their financial satis-
faction. The dotted lines cutting through the planes horizontally and vertically rep-
resent the medians with respect to the different indicators among the countries in 
the sample. The grey diagonal lines represent the perfect congruence between chil-
dren’s and parents’ values. Unsurprisingly, most values are within the lower triangle, 
i.e. parents on average tend to evaluate their economic situation better and are more 
satisfied with their economic situation than their children. However, there are two 
instances where this is not the case: in Hungary and Greece, the young respondents 
16 The relevant variable is YQ8.
17 For all figures, frequencies have been adjusted using post-stratification weights based on gender, age, 
education and NUTS 2 region.
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judge their own ability to afford extras (i.e. to afford extra trips and hobbies and 
to put aside money) as higher than their parents. This might reflect a cultural shift 
between the two generations in these countries, wherein young people are perhaps 
more willing to treat themselves to extras than their parents. In fact, by comparing 
the distance from the diagonal lines of the points in the two top panels, this phe-
nomenon appears to spread beyond Hungary and Greece: in general, the advantage 
of the parents over their children is more pronounced with respect to their ability to 
afford basics than to afford extras in all countries except Denmark. One last observa-
tion worth noting is the dramatic difference in parents’ and their children’s ability to 
afford basics in Spain and to a lesser extent in Greece. In the former case, parents 
rate their ability one point higher on average than their children, which on a four-
point scale means a quarter of the full range. The Greek case is more puzzling, as 
the young respondents appear to be much less able to afford basic standard of living 
Fig. 2  Economic self-sufficiency and financial satisfaction of young people and their parents
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costs than their parents, but more able to afford extras. This is an interesting aspect 
of the data and deserves a more thorough investigation, especially considering the 
Greek experience with austerity (see Ladi 2014; Andriopoulou et al. 2018).
Moving on to financial satisfaction, the bottom panel tells a similar story. The 
absence of values in the upper triangle indicates that in no case are children on aver-
age more satisfied than their parents. However, the picture shows some interesting 
variation. For example, parents in Spain are almost twice as likely to be satisfied 
than their children (60% vs. 36%), whereas in Greece parents are nearly as dissatis-
fied as their children with their own finances (30% in both cases). Looking at the 
countries’ relative positions with respect to the median, it is clear that most cross-
country variation in terms of generational change occurs among the least affluent 
countries in the sample. All Southern and Central-Eastern European countries are 
within the bottom 50% of the distribution in terms of average financial satisfaction. 
While in Greece and Hungary there seems to be more intergenerational similarity, in 
Italy and Spain the older respondents are much more likely to be satisfied than the 
younger ones. The remaining and wealthier countries are sorted diagonally in near-
perfect manner, indicating a striking similarity between the most affluent societies 
with respect to intergenerational change.
Attitudes towards welfare benefits and universal basic income
Economic self-sufficiency describes the extent to which individuals are able to 
provide for themselves without external aid. Such aid, in the case of young adults, 
typically comes in the form of economic support from the family and/or the wel-
fare state (Esping-Andersen 1999). Chevalier (2016) shows that in some European 
countries, families play a crucial role for the direct or indirect provision of welfare 
support, indicating that welfare regimes are “familialised” (Esping-Andersen 1999; 
see also Saraceno 2016). In other countries, such as Sweden, welfare support for 
young people is “defamilialised”, which means that young people are treated no dif-
ferent than adults and they are entitled to the same social rights regardless of age. In 
Southern European countries such as Italy, families are the units that directly sup-
ply welfare support. With this welfare mode, there is also a risk of concentration of 
wealth in families when the state does not provide welfare support. In Continental 
European countries such as Germany, while welfare support is provided by the state, 
practically, it is supplied via the family.
Family support may take a psychological toll on the individuals, by lowering the recip-
ients’ self-esteem or undermining their feeling of independence and self-efficacy (Finger-
man et al. 2013). Consequently, young adults who are not economically self-sufficient 
may develop a preference for generous (and “defamilialised”) social policies or other 
forms of wealth redistribution as an alternative to the direct support from the family.
Preferences for redistribution are a heavily researched topic in political econ-
omy, as (re-)distributional preferences are in essence the main source of division 
between the economic left and right in most democracies (Alesina and Giuliano 
2011). Many of the explanations proposed elaborate on two broad mechanisms. 
The first mechanism refers to economic self-interest, where individuals belonging 
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to lower income groups are expected to have a greater preference for redistribu-
tive policies. The second mechanism is about individual beliefs, where prefer-
ences are shaped by attitudes regarding acceptable degrees of societal inequal-
ity or poverty. Such attitudes are shaped by the family (Neundorf et  al. 2013; 
Albacete 2014), either through the transmission of values (Abendschön 2013) or 
the provision of financial support independent from the state (see Alesina and 
Giuliano 2011). Moreover, economic self-interest and beliefs are interrelated; 
individuals tend to justify their own status and the reality surrounding them (see 
Benabou and Tirole 2006). Their social position, in turn, influences perceptions 
of inequality and poverty in society (see Dawtry et al. 2015).
While it lies beyond the scope of this article to extensively discuss the determi-
nants of attitudes towards welfare policies and redistribution, we seek to demon-
strate that the CUPESSE data provide an opportunity to link young respondents’ 
economic self-sufficiency to their preferences for the corresponding policies, 
while controlling for their parents’ preferences. In particular, we look at the atti-
tudes towards universal minimum income and welfare benefits.
The two items are stimulus sentences to which the respondents were asked to 
state their level of agreement on a four-point scale, ranging from “strongly disa-
gree” to “strongly agree”. The respondents’ attitudes towards universal minimum 
income are captured by the statement “Everyone should have the right to a mini-
mum income even if they are not working”. Attitudes towards welfare benefits are 
assessed based on the degree of agreement/disagreement with the statement “If 
welfare benefits are too high there is no incentive to find work”.18
Fig. 3  Attitudes of young people and their parents on universal basic income and welfare benefits
18 The two respective variables are YQ21_f and YQ21_c for the young adults, PMQ18_f and PMQ18_c 
for the mothers, and PFQ18_f and PFQ18_c for the fathers. The scale of the item on welfare benefits has 
been reversed for these analyses in order to have both items ranging from a negative to a positive attitude.
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Figure 3 shows the country averages of the responses given by young adults and 
their parents. The diagonal lines represent perfect congruence between young adults 
and parents, while the dotted lines cutting through the plain are the medians. The 
first striking observation is the similarity between young adults and parents with 
respect to their attitudes on universal minimum income and welfare benefits. Most 
observations are on the diagonal lines, or very close to it. Moreover, no clear geo-
graphical patterns emerge. While respondents in Southern Europe tend to support a 
universal minimum income, this pattern does not re-appear with respect to welfare 
benefits. Overall, Fig. 3 shows that the two generations surveyed in the context of 
the CUPESSE project are remarkably similar with respect to the two attitudes con-
sidered in the 11 countries included in the sample.
How do respondents’ preferences for universal minimum income and welfare ben-
efits relate to their own degree of economic self-sufficiency? To answer this question, 
Fig. 4 shows the coefficients of two ordinal logit models where the two variables are 
regressed on a number of young adults’ and parental characteristics.19 The two pan-
els at the top show the coefficients of the indicators of young adults’ economic self-
sufficiency discussed in the previous section. The two panels at the bottom show the 
Fig. 4  Results of the ordinal logit regression models
19 See Table A1 in the Supplemental Material for the full model results, including country dummies and 
cut points between the response categories.
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coefficients for the parents’ ability to afford basic living standards and extras, their 
financial satisfaction and their responses to the respective attitudinal questions.20
Starting with the parents’ indicators, the only variables that have a significant and 
positive effect are the parents’ own attitudes on the respective indicators. This is not 
surprising given the results observed in Fig. 3. In a way, the function of these two 
variables in the regression models can be regarded as similar to a lagged dependent 
variable in a time-series regression: they capture all the sources of unobserved indi-
vidual variation that can be explained, in this case, by family ideology and beliefs. 
The lack of a significant marginal effect for the three indicators of parental economic 
situation is also unsurprising, as the contribution of these factors for young adults’ 
preferences is likely to be mediated by the parents’ own preferences or by young 
adults’ own economic situation.
Turning to the young adults, a greater ability to afford extras and having a fully 
independent income are both negatively associated with holding positive attitudes 
towards both universal basic income and welfare benefits. In other words, the greater 
the degree of self-sufficiency, the lower the demand for redistributive policies. This 
finding supports the “rational” explanation of preferences, according to which peo-
ple who are worse-off economically are more likely to support generous welfare 
policies. Finally, respondents who do not live with their parents tend, on average, 
to have a slightly more positive attitude towards welfare benefits. This may be due 
to the greater need for public support for individuals who cannot rely on the family 
to assist with housing costs, for example. Overall, the models show that both the 
parental and the young respondents’ own economic self-sufficiency have an impact 
on their attitudes towards redistributive policies. We believe that these initial find-
ings merit closer attention by future research, which can draw on the CUPESSE data 
presented in this article.
Conclusion
The small snapshot of CUPESSE data we presented here illustrates that there exist 
numerous noteworthy differences in the socio-economic situation of young people 
and their parents in Europe, in particular the significant differences with regard to 
economic self-sufficiency across the two generations. This is an important obser-
vation since Europe has entered a critical phase of its integration process with the 
looming Brexit and the increase in right-wing populist parties benefitting from pub-
lic support (Corduwener 2017). Against this background, pro-EU politicians such as 
French President Emanuel Macron have called for deepening the EU through inten-
sified integration. Yet considering the differences in the perceived and actual liv-
ing conditions of young people in the EU, particularly when compared to their par-
ents’ generation, such calls may fail to attract support and even backfire (see Kaina 
2013). This finding becomes even more important when considering that young 
people have typically been the main supporters of European integration in the past. 
20 All variables are coded in the same way as explained previously.
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Therefore, we believe that the unfolding debate on reforming the EU must take into 
account not only geographical differences, but also—and arguably even more so—
intergenerational differences and treat these as a starting point for policy action. We 
are certain that the empirical approach developed by the CUPESSE project can be 
useful in informing future research and policy-making.
The CUPESSE data not only provide information on economic self-sufficiency 
for two generations, but also cover a wide range of additional topics that provide a 
nuanced picture of young Europeans’ socio-economic situation. The dataset offers 
insights into the cultural and social capital endowment of young people as well as their 
values with regard to work. It also contains information that can help explain how 
young people make decisions regarding education and training, employment and self-
employment (e.g. Mühlböck et al. 2017; Dvouletý et al. 2018). The dataset has vari-
ables relating to the health status of the respondents (Vancea and Utzet 2017, 2018) 
as well as their experiences using public services when searching for employment 
(see Shore and Tosun 2017). Rather unusual for a dataset in political science, it also 
contains information on parenting style (with a view towards better understanding the 
intergenerational transmission of values and resources; see Warmuth et al. 2015) and 
concepts related to personality and grit (see Arco-Tirado et al. 2018).
Overall, this data source allows social scientists to investigate the multidimen-
sionality of the challenges young people currently face, and how these challenges 
impact their attitudes on welfare policies and redistribution.
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